LOGICAL POSITIVISM AND VISIONARY PRAGMATISM
miriam berg
(11/1/2004)
For several decades i have considered myself a logical positivist,|
the concepts of which i learned primarily from my friend Buzzy
Turner, who passed away in 1963, and also from my friend Bill
Handley, who was a well-known fixture in Berkeley although most people
knew him as "Santa Claus", because he wore a Santa Claus costume while
collecting donations for the Berkeley Free Clinic in front of banks in
downtown Berkeley. He had been a philosophy major in college and knew
more about philosophical systems than anyone else i have ever met.
Although i have had this conviction, and have asserted it at many
times and in many gatherings, i had not read anything by anyone
who claimed to be a logical positivist or to explain it, so i did
not have any kind of a reasoned basis for my assertion. It was
enough for me, because it seemed to me to be irrefutable, to
answer the question, "What is logical positivism?" by saying: It
is the principle or belief that nothing needs to be accepted
as true without evidence. To this day i still feel that that axiom is
a true statement of my philosophy, or at least part of it.
In more recent years i have learned that the original basis for
logical positivism was the axiom: Every statement is either true,|
or false, or meaningless. In the 1980s Bill Handley explained to me
that this axiom itself had been declared inadequate, because it was
impossible to determine whether the statement itself was true, false,|
or meaningless. I have also learned from reading modern books on
philosophy, notably by Donald Palmer, that logical positivism is
considered disproven and is generally rejected by modern philosophers,|
because no one can figure out whether the axiom is true of itself.
But no one has yet showed me that my claim to a right to disbelieve
any statement for which there is no evidence is invalid. It was
forcefully asserted by Leucippus and Democritus in ancient Greece
in the 5th century B.C.E., as follows: Nothing exists but atoms and
empty space; all else is merely opinion. Now, is this statement itself
merely opinion? probably yes, because there are many people whose
opinion is different, that there are transcendental or spiritual things
which exist as well as or within empty space and whirling atoms but are
not themselves atoms or emptiness. Modern rationalists have attempted
to show that even these things can be traced down to atomic and
electronic forces, so as to "prove" Democritus' statement; but no one
has yet shown that hope, and fear, and love, and choosing this instead
of that or turning to the right or to the left can be derived from
quantum mechanics.
So does that mean that i believe that those things have an
existence as well as atoms and empty space, and that the statement
by Leucippus and Democritus was wrong? To answer this, we probably
need to arrive at a better understanding of those entities that are
referred to by the words "hope", "fear", "love", and "choice". Let me
only answer this question by saying, No; it only means that i do not
believe that they can be derived from quantum mechanics, since that
they are all examples of creaturely behavior, and cannot exist without
creatures to exhibit them. Therefore the statement is still true that
"All else is merely opinion", as long as we cannot identify those
things without creatures to exhibit them.
Bill Handley often used to present the statement, "Triangles bend
emotions", as an example of a meaningless statement, in the days
that he himself considered himself a logical positivist. I used
to argue that the statement was not meaningless, since it was possible
to conceive of pictures or constructed objects of triangular shape to
influence or "bend" people's emotions. That does not seem difficult
to understand the statement to mean, so it does not seem meaningless
to me. Sherlock Holmes once quoted "Life pheasant's hen" and "the of
for" as meaningless, but it is difficult to consider those to be
"statements", since they don't state anything.
However, the important point about the traditional axiom as stated
for logical positivism which i wish to underline is that there is
no statement which can be truly said to be meaningless, as long
as it is composed of words for which the meanings of the words are
understood and the grammatical structure is declarative, that is, that
it is an assertion of something, in whatever form in whatever language
expresses itself. Tik-tok's famous verbalization in L. Frank Baum's
book "The Land of Oz": "...fizidigle cumsoluting hybergobble intuzibick"
may in fact be meaningless, but it is not a statement in any known
language, and might in fact have a meaning in clockwork language.
So i believe that this axiom should be restated as: All statements
are either true or false or ambiguous. An ambiguous statement is
one which may be true or may be false, but not enough information
is given to determine which. Similarly, my own understanding of the
useful side of logical positivism may be stated as: We are not obliged
to believe any statement unless some evidence is given supporting that
statement. This formulation is ambiguous within the tighter definition
I have given, because we do not know for certain what "obligation"
consists of. So all i can positively assert is that "Logical positivism
means for me, that i am not obligated to believe any statement unless
some evidence is given for that statement." Others may find this to
be true for themselves as well, or as false for themselves, or as
ambiguous; but it is not meaningless.
Let me now begin to discuss the concept of "visionary pragmatism"
with you. Elsewhere i have written that i do not consider myself
to be a mystic, or a mystical person, that is, someone who believes
that there are things which can be known and experienced but not
understood or explained. If it means that there is something or some
things which exist but cannot be apprehended through the ordinary
senses, well, i do not believe in that either, because there is no
evidence for them which can be shown to me. But there have been
friends, particularly in the Society of Friends to which i
belong, who have responded to my claim that i am not a mystic by
saying, Yes, you are, you just don't realize it.
Now i don't like to contradict people unless i have some evidence
or basis for doing so, so i usually don't respond to that assertion
about what i believe but don't realize it, especially after i have
explained the kind of mystic i do not consider myself to be and they do
not give me an alternate definition of what a mystic is so i can decide
whether that definition fits me or not. But one lesson i have drawn
from this occasional experience is, Perhaps other people know me better
than i know myself, i don't know. This of course follows from one of my
other principles, which is, One cannot be sure of anything. But i think
that is merely a restatement of Leucippus' and Democritus' statement that
all other than atoms and empty space is merely opinion. Isaac Azimov also
formulated it as the Skeptic's Creed: I accept only what i am forced to
accept by reasonably reliable evidence; and i keep that acceptance
tentative pending the arrival of further evidence.